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UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY AND EXCLUSIVE PRESIDENTIAL 
POWERS 
Julian G. Ku* 
The Unitary Executive offers a powerful case for the historical pedi-
gree of the unitary executive theory.  Offering an account of presi-
dential practice stemming from George Washington to George W. 
Bush, the book seeks to ground unitary executive theory with exhaus-
tive historical evidence.  Although the authors do not purport to pre-
sent a history of the presidency, they do provide important and com-
pelling evidence of a broad and longstanding understanding by 
Presidents and Congresses in favor of an exclusive presidential power 
to remove government officials.  In doing so, the authors’ primary 
goal is to bolster unitary executive theory with historical evidence.  
But they have a second, more subtle goal:  to disassociate unitary ex-
ecutive theory from the theories of presidential powers invoked by 
the administration of George W. Bush.1  “Despite the current admini-
stration’s attempt to tie claims of emergency presidential powers to 
the theory of the unitary executive, the inherent executive power that 
it seeks to assert has little to do with the framers’ decision to vest the 
executive power in a single person . . . .”2 
In this essay, I suggest that this attempt to save unitary executive 
power theory from the Bush Administration is not likely to succeed.  
While I agree with the authors that there is no necessary correlation 
between unitary executive power theory and inherent executive pow-
er, I think the authors are overlooking a characteristic of unitary the-
ory that is likely to maintain its association with theories of strong and 
unchecked executive power.  In my view, the most troubling and po-
tentially dangerous claims by the executive occur not when Presidents 
make claims of inherent executive power.  Rather, the most difficult 
claims arise from cases where the President is claiming exclusive 
presidential power; that is to say, cases where the President argues 
that he has a constitutional power that cannot be trumped or limited 
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by congressional action.  The best example of the controversial na-
ture of these claims is the use, by both the George W. Bush and Ob-
ama Administrations, of signing statements claiming the right to dis-
regard the effect of congressional statutes.  I will argue that unitary 
executive theory, even that version of unitary executive theory ex-
pounded by the authors, is a species of this exclusive executive power.  
For this reason, unitary theory will almost certainly be subject to the 
same kind of criticism and structural mistrust as other claims of ex-
clusive executive power. 
In this brief essay, I will first define what I mean by the terms “ex-
clusive” and “inherent” in the context of executive powers.  Then, I 
will illustrate the controversial nature of exclusive executive power by 
reviewing the recent controversy over the use of signing statements in 
both the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations.  Finally, I will 
argue that unitary executive theory, as an exclusive presidential pow-
er, is likely to remain a foundation for supporters of executive power 
and, likewise, remain a target of critics of overexpansive executive 
power. 
I.  INHERENT VERSUS EXCLUSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER 
Although it is merely a concurrence that reflected the views of on-
ly one justice, Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer has become a canonical statement 
about the nature of U.S. presidential powers.3  The core of the opin-
ion is Jackson’s division of presidential power into three categories.  
In the first category, the President acts at the height of his powers be-
cause he acts with the consent of Congress under full statutory au-
thority. 
In the second category, the President acts without clear statutory 
authority, and Congress has not clearly authorized what the President 
is doing.  It is here that the concept of “inherent” executive powers 
becomes useful.  Where Congress has not specifically prohibited a 
presidential act, the theory of inherent executive powers under the 
Constitution authorizes the presidential action.  An early version of 
this theory was presented by Alexander Hamilton in his famous de-
bate with James Madison, arguing that the vesting of “executive pow-
ers” in the President by Article II results in a general grant of powers.4  
Jackson’s more pragmatic formulation explains that “congressional 
 
 3 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 4 See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 39 
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969). 
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inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a prac-
tical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presiden-
tial responsibility.”5 
In the final category, the President acts against the background of 
express congressional prohibition.  This is usually the category that, 
when teaching this case, I often tell students that the President is go-
ing to lose.  But Justice Jackson’s formula doesn’t quite say this.  In-
stead, he suggests that courts can “sustain exclusive presidential con-
trol in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon 
the subject.”6  He then goes on to warn, “Presidential claim to a 
power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with 
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our con-
stitutional system.”7 
Jackson’s formulation thus tracks the three main theories of ex-
ecutive power.  In category one, the President acts pursuant to an ex-
press, delegated power from Congress.  In category two, the President 
acts pursuant to his inherent powers drawn from the Constitution ra-
ther than from Congress.  Inherent powers invoked in this category, 
Jackson posits, can be limited or even prohibited by Congress.  In 
category three, the President also draws upon powers granted to him 
from the Constitution.  But in this category, the President might act 
even against the express will of Congress if the subject is one of his 
exclusive control. 
The power of Jackson’s concurrence is largely descriptive since it 
does not offer a mechanism for determining which inherent execu-
tive powers are also exclusive (category three) and which ones are in-
herent but non-exclusive (category two).  Instead, the Jackson con-
currence suggests the resolution of such questions may be 
intertwined with political considerations and presidential practice. 
II.  THE CONTROVERSY OVER SIGNING STATEMENTS 
In the Jackson formulation, the most troubling and difficult cate-
gory is the third category.  This makes sense intuitively.  Unlike in-
herent power theory, a claim of exclusive presidential power is abso-
lute and cannot be overridden by Congress.  For political reasons 
alone, it is not surprising that Congress should be sensitive to any 
claim by the President of exclusive powers. 
 
 5 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 6 Id. at 637–38. 
 7 Id. at 638. 
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The controversy over presidential signing statements offers a re-
cent example of this heightened congressional sensitivity.  Signing 
statements are presidential statements attached to legislation upon 
the signature of such legislation into law.  Although signing state-
ments have a long history, the modern practice of using signing 
statements began with President Reagan and continued through the 
administrations of Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and 
George W. Bush.8  Such statements generally offered presidential in-
terpretations of the laws they were signing.  These presidential inter-
pretations served at least two purposes.  First, these interpretations 
served to instruct subsequent executive branch officials charged with 
executing the new law with the President’s preferred interpretation. 
Second, and much more controversially, Presidents have used 
signing statements to signal that they believe certain provisions of the 
statutes are unconstitutional and that they will adopt interpretations 
that avoid such unconstitutional results or even refuse to enforce cer-
tain statutory provisions.  Although this second use of signing state-
ments stretched across both Republican and Democratic administra-
tions, signing statements only became a controversial flashpoint 
during the administration of President George W. Bush.  After Presi-
dent Bush attached a signing statement to the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 limiting the effect of provisions governing the interroga-
tion of detainees, opposition to signing statements became a rallying 
cry for opponents of the Bush Administration’s war on terrorism pol-
icies.  An ABA Blue Ribbon Task Force, backed by the ABA House of 
Delegates, issued a report opposing the issuance of presidential sign-
ing statements that claim the authority or state the intention “to dis-
regard or decline to enforce all or part of a law the President has 
signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with the 
clear intent of Congress.”9 
Hence, the focus of the ABA criticism was not on signing state-
ments that purport to instruct the bureaucracy on how the President 
interprets the law.  Rather, the focus was on signing statements that 
claimed a presidential power to refuse to execute a law passed by 
Congress and signed (indeed, just signed) by the President.  As the 
ABA report urged: 
 
 8 The earliest recognition of the practice by the Supreme Court dates back to La Abra Silver 
Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 454 (1899).  See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
DOCTRINE, RECOMMENDATION, 10–18 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 
RECOMMENDATION]. 
 9 ABA TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 8, at 1. 
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[T]he President [should] confine any signing statements to his views re-
garding the meaning, purpose and significance of bills presented by 
Congress, and if he believes that all or part of a bill is unconstitutional, to 
veto the bill in accordance with Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of the 
United States, which directs him to approve or disapprove each bill in its 
entirety[.]10 
The report then singled out for criticism President George W. Bush’s 
signing statements raising constitutional objections to requirements 
that government officials report directly to Congress on matters rang-
ing from the Patriot Act, a federal nuclear waste facility, the Educa-
tion Department’s statistics on student performance, and the Defense 
Department’s investigations of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 
Iraq.11  It is striking that the report would single out these signing 
statements since President Bush was essentially making arguments 
drawn from unitary executive theory that posited, as Calabresi and 
Yoo have documented, that Congress cannot interfere with the Presi-
dent’s control over subordinate executive branch officials.  Indeed, 
the report singles out the unitary executive theory as an important 
framework for many of the signing statement objections. 
While drawing the ire of the ABA, signing statements were not the 
most controversial legal opinion of the Bush years.  It is safe to say 
that this dubious honor belongs to the so-called Torture Memos in-
terpreting statutes limiting the abuse or mistreatment of detainees 
held in the war on terrorism.  Indeed, one of these memos was so 
controversial that calls for the disbarment or prosecution of the au-
thors are commonplace.12  In the most famous opinion, President 
Bush’s lawyers argued for a narrow interpretation of the statute ban-
ning torture, in part because a broad interpretation would encroach 
on the President’s exclusive Commander in Chief powers.13  But per-
haps the most controversial constitutional argument contained in 
those memos was the argument that congressional limitations on in-
terrogations might be disregarded if they encroached on the exclu-
sive power of the President under the Commander in Chief clause.  
The idea that the President could disregard the express will of Con-
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 14–17. 
 12 See, e.g., Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 347 
(2007).  But see Julian G. Ku, The Wrongheaded and Dangerous Campaign to Criminalize Good 
Faith Legal Advice, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 449 (2009) (criticizing efforts to prosecute 
the authors of such memos). 
 13 Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Pres-
ident on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, 36–38 
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ 
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf. 
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gress (especially on such an explosive issue) contributed to the pas-
sion of the memos’ critics and the pushback from defenders of con-
gressional powers. 
President Obama recently discovered the bipartisan nature of this 
pushback after he attached the following signing statement objecting 
to legislation that directed his officers to advocate for certain views 
when participating in the governance of international financial insti-
tutions: 
[Such provisions] would interfere with my constitutional authority to 
conduct foreign relations by directing the Executive to take certain posi-
tions in negotiations or discussions with international organizations and 
foreign governments, or by requiring consultation with the Congress 
prior to such negotiations or discussions.  I will not treat these provisions 
as limiting my ability to engage in foreign diplomacy or negotiations.14 
Like President Bush before him, President Obama is asserting a right 
to simply refuse to follow statutes that he believes are unconstitu-
tional.  Although the provisions in the bill in question plainly re-
quired the Secretary of the Treasury to adopt certain positions during 
activities at the International Monetary Fund, President Obama sim-
ply declared that he would treat those provisions as nonbinding due 
to their interference in his inherent constitutional authority to con-
duct foreign relations.  He did so without relying on any Supreme 
Court precedent for his views.15 
The New York Times criticized President Obama’s signing state-
ments, especially those that asserted independent presidential power 
to interpret the Constitution.  If he wants to assert such a power, the 
paper editorialized, “then he should be able to point to court deci-
sions or he should find a way to get the issue into court so the judici-
ary can make a call.”16  Indeed, the House of Representatives has 
demonstrated its displeasure with President Obama by voting by an 
overwhelming margin to take away funding for areas over which the 
President asserted his independent constitutional authority.17 
 
 14 Statement by President Barack Obama Upon Signing the Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, 2009, June 24, 2009, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. S34, S34, available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900512.pdf. 
 15 See id. 
 16 Editorial, On Signing Statements, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at A26. 
 17 Walter Alarkon, House Overwhelmingly Rejects Signing Statement, HILL, July 9, 2009, available 
at http://thehill.com/homenews/house/49864-house-overwhelmingly-rejects-signing-
statement. 
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III.  EXCLUSIVE PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
THEORY 
As the signing statement contretemps shows, any claims of exclu-
sive presidential power, no matter how well grounded, can spark 
condemnation by Congress and the public.  The driving force behind 
such opposition, I argue, is the President’s assertion of an exclusive 
power that Congress cannot limit. 
Unitary executive theory is a species of this kind of controversial 
exclusive presidential power.  According to the authors, “The Consti-
tution gives presidents the power to control their subordinates by 
vesting all of the executive power in one, and only one, person:  the 
president of the United States.”18  They document, exhaustively, an 
unbroken presidential practice of supporting this view of executive 
power to appoint, remove, and direct subordinate executive officials.  
And most importantly, when Congress passes a statute purporting to 
encroach on this power, as it did during the Andrew Johnson admini-
stration’s Tenure of Office Act, the authors condemn such laws as 
unconstitutional.  But such laws could only be unconstitutional if the 
executive power to remove officials was an exclusive, and not merely 
an inherent, presidential prerogative. 
To be sure, the potential for abuse of such powers is not quite the 
same as when the President seeks to coercively interrogate detainees.  
But all claims of exclusive power, as Justice Jackson observed, pose se-
rious dangers to the equilibrium of the Constitution’s system of sepa-
ration of powers.  So all need careful attention.  Anytime a branch 
seeks to claim a constitutional trump card, they are undermining in-
ter-branch cooperation and setting up almost inevitable inter-branch 
conflict. 
I have argued elsewhere that there should indeed be exclusive ex-
ecutive powers in some cases and that courts have recognized this as 
such. 19  But I do agree with Justice Jackson that such claims pose seri-
ous challenges to the Constitution.  The reaction of the public and 
commentators to such claims during the Bush Administration, and of 
Congress during the Obama Administration, reflects the gravity of 
the problem in part.  And it is for this reason that I doubt that the Ca-
labresi and Yoo project of separating the unitary executive from con-
troversial theories of strong executive power will ultimately succeed. 
 
 18 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 4. 
 19 See Julian G. Ku, Is There an Exclusive Commander-in-Chief Power?, YALE L.J. (THE POCKET 
PART), Mar. 2006, http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/03/ku.html. 
